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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the modal-fuzzy logic FPΠ(RLΔ) for reasoning about probability and possibility
at the same time. We will use such a logical formalism in order to treat mixed assessments of both those
kinds of measures. The main result of this paper is a characterization of the coherence for rational mixed
assessments by means of the logical consistency of a suitably deﬁned FPΠ(RLΔ)-theory. By means of this
characterization, we will also prove that the problem of testing the coherence of a mixed assessment is
NP-complete.
Keywords: Probability Measure, Possibility Measure, Fuzzy Logics, Coherence, Computational
Complexity.
1 Introduction
Probability theory and possibility theory [4] are two important mathematical tools
which aim at formalizing diﬀerent aspects of the management of uncertain informa-
tion (see [20]). While probability has been deeply investigated in a logical setting
(see [16], and the references therein), there are not many logical treatments of pos-
sibility theory, with the relevant exception of possibilistic logic (see [3]).
1 Marchioni recognizes support of the grant No. AP2002-1571 of the Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia of
Spain.
2 Email: flaminio@unisi.it
3 Email: marchioni@usal.es
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 169 (2007) 33–42
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2006.07.027
1571-0661 © 2007 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
In this paper we present a logic to reason with probabilistic and possibilistic
information at the same time. The logic we introduce is a fuzzy modal logic like
those introduced in [5,7,17,9,13,14] where simple and conditional probability and
possibility have been studied. The basic idea underlying this approach consists in
regarding the probability (the possibility) of an event (i.e. an equivalence class of
Boolean propositional formulas) as the truth degree of the sentence ϕ is probable (ϕ
is possible respectively). In order to do that, we only need to add to the language of
a suitably chosen fuzzy logic a unary modality P , for probable, (Π for possible) and
adequate axioms reﬂecting those of the related measure. In this way Ha´jek, Godo
and Esteva introduced in [14] the logic FP(L) (FΠ(L)), where FP stands for Fuzzy-
Probabilistic. In this setting the probability (possibility) of ϕ can be understood as
the truth degree of the modal formula P (ϕ) (Π(ϕ)) which reads ϕ is probable (ϕ is
possible). A more expressive variant of this logic will be introduced in this work so
as to allow the treatment of both simple probability and possibility measures.
An important issue in probability and possibility theory is the concept of coher-
ence. Recall that a probabilistic assessment χ : P (ϕi) = αi (i = 1, . . . , n) is said
coherent iﬀ there exists a probability measure θ deﬁned over the Boolean algebra
generated by the events ϕi, such that, for each i = 1, . . . , n, θ(ϕi) = P (ϕi). Analo-
gously, the notion of coherence can be deﬁned for assessments of simple possibility.
In [9,7,17] the probabilistic and the possibilistic coherence have been character-
ized by means of the logical consistency of a suitably deﬁned theory relying on a
particular fuzzy logic.
The main goal of the present work consists in providing a logical analysis of
mixed assessments of probability and possibility, i.e. assessments of both measures
over the same set of events. When can we say that a mixed assessment is coherent?
In order to give an answer to this question, we will introduce the notion of internal
and external coherence for mixed assessments. We will say that a mixed assessment
is coherent iﬀ it satisﬁes both the internal and the external coherence properties.
Roughly speaking, a mixed assessment is coherent iﬀ each assessment is coherent
per se (internal coherence) and moreover the assessments satisfy the law saying that
if an event is probable, then it is possible too (external coherence).
This idea was ﬁrst studied in [1], where a nice characterization theorem was
proved. In this work we will frame that characterization into a logical setting and
also provide some results about the computational complexity for the coherence test
for mixed rational assessments.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we will introduce some
basic notions and results about the logic RLΔ, which will be exploited in order to
build the fuzzy modal logic FPΠ(RLΔ), that we will study in the same section.
In Section 3 we introduce a formal deﬁnition of coherence for mixed assessments
and we characterize the coherence of mixed assessments by means of the logical
consistence of suitably deﬁned theories over FPΠ(RLΔ). In Section 4 we investigate
the computational complexity for the coherence test. We end with some comments
about the present and the future work.
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2 A modal logic for probability and possibility
2.1 The logic RLΔ and DMVΔ-algebras
In this ﬁrst subsection we introduce and recall some results and notions concerning
the logic RLΔand the related class of DMVΔ-algebras (see [11,7]).
Deﬁnition 2.1 The formulas of RLΔ are built from a countable set of propositional
variables p0, p1, . . ., the propositional constants 0 and, as usual, from the binary
connectives → and ⊕ and the unary connectives ¬, Δ and, for each n ∈ N, δn.
The axioms and rules of RLΔ are:
(L) All the axioms and rules of Lukasiewicz logic (see [13] for more details).
(Δ) The following axioms schema for Δ:
(Δ1) Δ(ϕ → ψ) → (Δϕ → Δψ),
(Δ2) Δϕ ∨ ¬Δϕ,
(Δ3) Δϕ → ϕ,
(Δ4) Δϕ → Δ(Δϕ),
(Δ5) Δ(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ (Δϕ ∨Δψ).
(G) The rule of Generalization: ϕΔϕ .
(Dn) For each n ∈ N, the following axiom schemas for δn:
(D1) n.δnϕ ↔ ϕ,
(D2) ¬δnϕ⊕ (n − 1).¬(δnϕ),
where n.ϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ⊕ . . .⊕ ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-times
.
The algebraic counterpart of RLΔ is a class of algebras called in [7] DMVΔ-
algebras. Roughly speaking, every DMVΔalgebra can be regarded as an MV-algebra
(see [13]) enriched with the Baaz delta and the division operator δn (one for each
n ∈ N). DMVΔ-algebras form a variety.
The prototypical example of a DMVΔ-algebra is the system
[0, 1]DMVΔ = 〈[0, 1],⊕,¬,Δ, {δn}n∈N, 0, 1〉
where [0, 1] is the real unit interval and, for each x, y ∈ [0, 1]:
• x⊕ y = min{1, x + y},
• ¬x = 1− x,
• Δ(x) = 1 if x = 1 and Δ(x) = 0 otherwise,
• for each n ∈ N, δn(x) = x/n.
An evaluation of RLΔ-formulas into [0, 1]DMVΔ is a map e from the set of propo-
sitional variables into interval [0, 1], which can be extended (in unique way) to
all RLΔ-formulas by means of the following inductive conditions: for all ϕ,ψ,
e(ϕ → ψ) = max{0, 1 − e(ϕ) + e(ψ)}, e(ϕ ⊕ ψ) = min{1, e(ϕ) + e(ψ)}, e(Δϕ) = 1
if e(ϕ) = 1 and e(Δϕ) = 0 otherwise, for each n ∈ N, e(δnϕ) = e(ϕ)/n.
For every theory Γ (i.e. set of formulas) and for every formula ϕ, we say that
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ϕ follows from Γ in RLΔ (RLΔ∪Γ 
 ϕ) iﬀ there is a ﬁnite sequence ψ1, . . . , ψn of
formulas such that ψn = ϕ and for i = 1, . . . , n, either ψi is an axiom of RLΔ, or
ψi ∈ Γ, or ψi can be derived by RLΔ-rules from a ﬁnite number of formulas ψj and
j < i.
In [7] RLΔ is shown to be complete with respect to the standard DMVΔ-algebra.
This means that, if RLΔ∪Γ 
 ϕ, then there is an evaluation e on the standard
DMVΔ-algebra [0, 1]DMVΔ such that e(γ) = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ and e(ϕ) < 1.
2.2 The logic FPΠ(RLΔ) and its semantic
In this section we introduce the modal fuzzy logic FPΠ(RLΔ) in order to reason
about both probability and possibility measures. FPΠ(RLΔ) is built up over RLΔ
extending its language by including modal formulas which represent the probability
and the possibility of Boolean events.
We deﬁne the language in two steps. First, we take into account classical Boolean
formulas ϕ, ψ, etc., deﬁned in the usual way from a denumerable class of propo-
sitional variables p0, p1, . . ., the truth constant 0 and classical connectives (∧,¬).
Then, modal sentences are formulas of the form 0, P (ϕ), Π(ϕ), where ϕ is a Boolean
formula and the unary operators P (·) and Π(·) stands for probability and possibility,
respectively. Compound modal formulas are built by means of the RLΔ-connectives
(→, &, ∧, ∨, Δ, and for each n ∈ N, δn). We shall denote modal formulas by upper
case Greek letters Φ,Ψ, etc. Nested modalities are not allowed.
The logic FPΠ(RLΔ) has the following axioms and rules:
- All the axioms and rules of classical logic for Boolean formulas.
- All the axioms and rules of RLΔ restricted to modal formulas.
- Probabilistic modal axioms for P :
(FP1) P (¬ϕ) ≡ ¬P (ϕ),
(FP2) P (ϕ → ψ) → (P (ϕ) → P (ψ)),
(FP3) P (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ [(P (ϕ) → P (ϕ ∧ ψ)) → P (ψ)].
- Possibilistic modal axioms for Π:
(FΠ1) Π(ϕ ∨ ψ) → (Π(ϕ) ∨Π(ψ)),
(FΠ2) ¬Π(0).
Deduction rules are
- P-modalization: ϕ
P (ϕ) ,
- Π-modalization: ϕΠ(ϕ) ,
- Π-monotonicity: ϕ→ψΠ(ϕ)→Π(ψ) .
Deﬁnition 2.2 A probabilistic-possibilistic Kripke model (PΠ-Kripke Model) is a
structure K = 〈W,U , e, ρ, μ〉, where:
- W is a non-empty set of possible worlds and U is a Boolean algebra of subsets of
W .
- e : V ×W → {0, 1} is such that, for each ﬁxed w ∈ W , the function e(·, w) : V →
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{0, 1} is a Boolean evaluation. Moreover let [ϕ]W = {w ∈ W | e(ϕ,w) = 1}.
- ρ : U → [0, 1] is a possibility measure over U , such that [ϕ]W is ρ-measurable for
any non-modal ϕ.
- μ : U → [0, 1] is a ﬁnitely additive probability measure over U , such that [ϕ]W is
μ-measurable for any non-modal ϕ.
The evaluation e(·, w) can be extended to elementary modal formulas by deﬁning
e(Π(ϕ), w) = ρ([ϕ]W ) and e(P (ϕ), w) = μ([ϕ]W ) and to arbitrary modal formulas
according to RLΔ-semantics.
The truth-degree of a formula Φ in an PΠ-Kripke structure K = 〈W,U , e, μ, ρ〉,
written ‖Φ‖K , is deﬁned as
‖Φ‖K = infw∈W e(Φ, w).
When ‖Φ‖K = 1 we will say that Φ is valid in K or that K is a model for Φ. We say
that K is a model of a set of T of formulas if K |= Φ for all Φ ∈ T . The notion of
logical entailment relative to the class M, written |=M, is then deﬁned as follows:
T |=M Φ iﬀ ‖Φ‖
M
T = 1 .
If M denotes the whole class of PΠ-Kripke structures we shall write T |=FPΠ Φ and
‖Φ‖FPΠT .
By exploiting the technique worked out in [13,8,19], it is not diﬃcult to prove
the following completeness theorem.
Theorem 2.3 (Completeness) The logic FPΠ(RLΔ) is and ﬁnite strong com-
plete with respect to the class of PΠ-Kripke models. In other words, given a modal
theory Γ and a modal formula Φ, whenever Γ 
FPΠ Φ, then there exists a PΠ-model
K which is a model of Γ, but such that ‖Φ‖K < 1.
Therefore the logic FPΠ(RLΔ) is a good logic for reasoning with probability and
possibility.
3 Application to the coherence problem
As pointed out in the introduction, an assessment of simple probability and possi-
bility will be called mixed whenever it is deﬁned over the same set of events. The
coherence of a mixed assessment is so deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let E = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} be a class of simple events and let (χ) :
μ(ϕi) = αi, ρ(ϕi) = βi be a mixed assessment, with αi, βi ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. We say that
χ is coherent if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(I) The partial assessments (χP ) : μ(ϕi) = αi and (χΠ) : ρ(ϕi) = βi are coherent
in their usual meaning (internal coherence).
(E) For each ψ ∈ B, μ(ψ) ≤ ρ(ψ), where B stands for the Boolean algebra generated
by ϕ1, . . . , ϕn (external coherence).
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The following characterization theorem for coherent mixed assessment was pro-
vided in [1]:
Theorem 3.2 ([1]) Let ρ be a possibility measure in the class of atoms A =
{a1, . . . , am}, let A be ordered such that ρ(a1) ≤ ρ(a2) ≤ . . . ≤ ρ(am) = 1, and
let P be a probability measure over A. Then, being B the Boolean algebra generated
by A, for each γ ∈ B, the following are equivalent:
(i) μ(γ) ≤ ρ(γ),
(ii)
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
μ(a1) ≤ ρ(a1)
i∑
j=1
μ(aj) ≤ ρ(ai) ∀i = 2, . . . ,m− 1.
In this section we will reduce the coherence of a mixed assessment to the logical
consistency a suitably deﬁned theory over FPΠ(RLΔ).
The following (famous) lemma of linear programming will turn out to be crucial
in proving the main result of this and the next section.
Lemma 3.3 ([2]) Let S be a system of r linear (in)equalities. Then S has a (non-
negative) solution iﬀ it has a non-negative solution with at most r positive entries.
Now the characterization theorem reads as follow.
Theorem 3.4 Let E = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} be a ﬁnite set of Boolean events, let A =
{a1, . . . , am} be the atoms generated by ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, and let
(χ) μ(ϕi) = αi, ρ(ϕi) = βi (i = 1, . . . , n),
be a rational mixed assessment over E. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (χ) is coherent,
(ii) There are n+1 atoms a1, . . . , an+1, such that the FPΠ(RLΔ)-theory Tχ, whose
proper axioms are
(A1)
n∧
i=1
Δ(P (ϕi) ≡ αi), (A2)
n∧
i=1
Δ(Π(ϕi) ≡ βi),
(A3)
n∧
i=1
Δ(Π(ai)→ Π(ai+1)), (A4)
n+1∧
j=1
Δ
[(
j⊕
i=1
P (ai)
)
→ Π(aj)
]
,
is logically consistent, i.e. Tχ 
FPΠ 0.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Let (χ) be coherent and let B be the Boolean algebra generated
by A. It means that there are a probability measure μ∗ and a possibility measure
ρ∗ deﬁned over B extending μ and ρ respectively. As usual (please see [19]) the
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coherence of ρ guarantees that the system
(SΠ)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max
ar⊆ϕi
ρ(ar) = βi ∀i = 1, . . . , n
m
max
r=1
ρ(ar) = 1
has a solution, and therefore, by Lemma 3.3, (SΠ) has a solution with at most
n+1 positive entries (being n+1 the number of (in)equalities of (SΠ)). Let, hence,
a1, . . . , an+1 be the atoms corresponding to those positive entries
4 .
Now, the coherence of (χ), also guarantees that each ψ ∈ B, μ∗ and ρ∗ satisfy
μ∗(ψ) ≤ ρ∗(ψ). This last point means, in particular, that, if ρ∗(ai1) ≤ ρ
∗(ai2) ≤
. . . ≤ ρ∗(ain+1) = 1 is the order over the above atoms induced by the possibilty ρ
∗,
then also the system
(S)
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
μ∗(ai1) ≤ ρ
∗(ai1)
j∑
k=1
μ∗(aik) ≤ ρ
∗(aij ) ∀j = 2, . . . , n + 1.
has a solution.
Let now ai1 , . . . , ain+1 be the above atoms and let K = 〈W, e, μ
∗, ρ∗〉, where:
- W is the set of all the Boolean evaluations over Boolean formulas,
- e : W × V → {0, 1} is, for all w ∈ W and p ∈ V , be deﬁned as e(w, p) = w(p)
- μ∗ and ρ∗ are as above.
Then, clearly K is a PΠ-Kripke model and, moreover:
- ‖(A1)‖K = 1 and ‖(A2)‖K = 1. In fact it the axioms (A1) and (A2) are just the
logical translation of the assessment and the claim easily follows by the deﬁnition
of K.
- ‖(A3)‖K = 1 and ‖(A4)‖K = 1. This is easy, and follows by the fact that the
system (S) is satisﬁed by μ∗ and ρ∗.
Hence, the theory Tχ is satisﬁable and so is consistent.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Let Tχ be logically consistent and let K = 〈W, e, μ
∗, ρ∗〉 be a PΠ-Kripke
model such that ‖Ψ‖K = 1 for all Ψ ∈ Tχ. In order to prove the coherence of χ we
have to show the following:
- μ and ρ are coherent as rational assessments of probability and possibility re-
spectively. This is easily guaranteed; in fact, in particular ‖(A1)‖K = 1 and this
holds iﬀ, for each i = 1, . . . , n, μ∗(ϕi) = αi. This means that μ
∗ is the required
probability measure extending μ assuring the coherence of μ. Similarly, it can be
shown that ρ∗ is the possibility measure extending ρ and, therefore, guaranteeing
its coherence.
4 Notice that this can be assumed without loss of generality and, at least, by choosing a diﬀerent indexing
for the atoms.
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- For each γ ∈ B, μ∗(γ) ≤ ρ∗(γ). Also this is easy to see. Indeed, just notice that
‖(A3)‖K = 1, ‖(A4)‖K = 1 hold iﬀ the hypothesis of Theorem 3.2 are satisﬁed
and thus, iﬀ μ∗(γ) ≤ ρ∗(γ) for each γ ∈ B.

4 Complexity issue
In this last section we are going to prove that testing the coherence of a mixed
assessment is an NP-complete problem.
As we know by [15] the satisﬁability problem for modal formulas of FP(L) is
NP-complete. Moreover, using the same techniques of [8] and [19], it is not diﬃcult
to prove an analogous result also for FPΠ(RLΔ). Therefore the following holds:
Theorem 4.1 The satisﬁability problem for modal formulas of FPΠ(RLΔ) is NP-
complete.
Let us start with a ﬁnite set of simple events E = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and a mixed
assessment
(χ) : μ(ϕi) = αi, ρ(ϕi) = βi (i = 1, . . . , n).
Due to Theorem 3.4 the coherence problem of (χ) can be reduced to the satisﬁability
problem for the modal FPΠ(RLΔ)-theory Tχ.
In this way NP-containment for the mixed coherence test is easily guaranteed
by the NP-completeness for the satisﬁability problem for FPΠ(RLΔ) and the fact
that Tχ has polynomial length (in the number n of events we started with). In
particular Tχ has n instances of (A1), n instances of (A2), n instances of (A3), and
ﬁnally n + 1 instances of (A4).
More precisely the NP-algorithm works as follows: let (χ) and E be deﬁned as
above. Then
Step 1 Randomly generate n + 2 atoms form the events in E .
Step 2 Build the theory Tχ.
Step 3 Test the satisﬁability of Tχ.
Clearly the above presented algorithm is NP.
Finally it is straightforward to notice that the problem is NP-hard. In fact it
derives from the fact that the problems PSAT and ΠSAT (which are known to be
NP-complete, see for instance [10,19]) of testing the coherence of an assessment of
simple probability and possibility are clearly sub-problems of testing the coherence
of a mixed assessment.
5 Final remarks
In this paper we have presented the logic FPΠ(RLΔ) in order to reason about simple
probability and possibility at the same time. We have also introduced the notion of
mixed assessment, that is an assessment of both probability and possibility, and we
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also extended the notion of coherence to this special case. The logic FPΠ(RLΔ) is a
good logic for treating mixed assessments and by means of this logic we also proved
that testing the coherence of a mixed assessment still is an NP-complete problem.
Notice that a more general approach to mixed assessments could be obtained by
treating also measure of necessity. In fact the necessity measure N can be deﬁned
from the possibility Π by means of the standard negation ns(x) = 1− x as
N (ϕ) = 1−Π(¬ϕ).
As we know, the interpretation of the Lukasiewicz negation corresponds to the
standard involutive negation ns, thus FPΠ(RLΔ) is a nice logic also for reasoning
about necessity measures as well. Clearly all the results provided in this paper can
be extended if we consider assessments where a necessity measure explicitly appears.
In particular the NP-containment sill holds. The trick consists, in fact, in looking
for all the occurrences of the necessity N (·) and replacing it by ¬Π(¬ ·), where ¬
is the Lukasiewicz negation. Clearly this transformation can be done in polynomial
time (with respect to the number of events taken into account).
In our future work we aim at extending this preliminary results so as to treat
measures of conditional probability and possibility as well. Indeed it is not diﬃcult
deﬁne a logic for conditional measures, and to prove a result similar to Theorem 3.4.
Unfortunately we have not been able, so far, to prove that, also in that case, the
test for mixed assessments is NP-complete. On the other hand we know that testing
assessments of conditional probability (see [8]) and conditional possibility (see [19])
is NP-complete, still it seems quite problematic to prove a nice characterization for
external coherence.
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